Last Week in Threats: Week 38
Bottom Line
What changed this week: A pair of actively exploited Cisco vulnerabilities landed in the KEV catalog, both targeting enterprise perimeter security: a SQL injection flaw in Secure Email Gateway enabling root command execution, and an authentication bypass in Identity Services Engine.
Who is most exposed: Organizations running Cisco email gateways or ISE for identity management, plus technology firms, manufacturers, and healthcare organizations facing a 14% ransomware volume increase driven by Qilin's near-quadruple surge.
Recommended action: Patch CVE-2026-76461 and CVE-2026-76460 immediately, hunt for unauthorized Cisco ISE authentication events and anomalous email gateway command execution, and review outbound data transfers from technology and manufacturing environments.
The Week in Review
The week of September 14 to 20, 2026 delivered a double Cisco vulnerability event targeting enterprise perimeter defenses. A pair of flaws hit CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: CVE-2026-76461, a SQL injection in Secure Email Gateway that grants root command execution, and CVE-2026-76460, an authentication bypass in Identity Services Engine. Both are under active exploitation with public proof-of-concept code in circulation, per AlienVault OTX (16 and 13 community pulses respectively, pulled September 21). Organizations relying on these systems for email filtering or network access control faced a compressed mitigation window.
Ransomware activity climbed to 185 leak-site postings (a 14% increase from last week's 162, per ransomware.live, pulled September 21). Qilin surged to the top with 31 victims, nearly quadrupling from eight the prior week. Technology firms (38 victims), manufacturers (31), and healthcare organizations (22) carried the highest sector concentration. The week's top 15 malicious IPs split evenly, seven on datacenter hosting and seven on compromised residential networks, with one Tor exit node, signaling attacks from both infrastructure and home broadband endpoints (AbuseIPDB 100% confidence blacklist, pulled September 21).
Ransomware Leak-Site Activity
The week produced 185 victim postings across ransomware leak sites, a 14% increase from the prior week's 162. Qilin dominated with 31 victims, surging from eight the week prior (nearly a 4x increase). The Gentlemen held second with 30 postings, up from 18. N0n appeared for the first time with 11 victims. The United States accounted for 58 postings, followed by 23 with unknown geography. Germany, Italy, and Brazil rounded out the top five victim countries. (Source: ransomware.live, aggregated from ledger data via aggregate-week.py, pulled September 21, 2026)
Most Active Groups by Victim Postings
Sector & Technology Watch
Technology firms bore the highest ransomware exposure this week with 38 victims, followed by manufacturing (31) and healthcare (22). The concentration signals persistent targeting of intellectual property and operational technology environments. The week's exploited vulnerabilities clustered in enterprise perimeter technology: identity and VPN systems (Cisco ISE authentication bypass), email gateways (Cisco Secure Email Gateway SQL injection), backup systems (Acronis cPanel/Plesk privilege escalation), and mobile devices (Google Pixel modem authorization flaw). Organizations running Cisco's email or identity stack faced the most compressed mitigation window. If you operate Cisco ISE or Secure Email Gateway, patch immediately and hunt for authentication anomalies and unexpected command execution in gateway logs.
Most-Targeted Industries
Most-Reported Malicious IPs
AbuseIPDB's 100% confidence list put 15 addresses at the top of the week's report counts, led by a residential address in Macau with 14,817 reports. Observed behavior centered on SSH brute-force, port scanning, and web-application attacks. The Shadowserver address listed below is a benign research scanner and belongs out of blocking rules, per GreyNoise Community.
- 182.93.7.194: AS4609 Companhia De Telecomunicacoes, ISP CTM, residential, 14,817 reports
- 64.225.30.2: AS14061 DigitalOcean LLC, hosting, 3,560 reports
- 94.154.43.84: AS7029 Windstream Communications LLC, ISP Storm Industries LLC, hosting, 2,433 reports
- 65.49.20.82: AS6939 Hurricane Electric LLC, ISP The Shadowserver Foundation, Inc., residential, 2,020 reports
- 103.117.145.130: AS45753 NetSec Limited, ISP Lighting Hosting Limited, hosting, 1,676 reports
- 85.204.70.102: ASN not resolved, ISP Hydra Communications Ltd, hosting, 1,515 reports
- 103.191.204.229: ASN not resolved, ISP Vishwamani Solutions Pvt Ltd, residential, 982 reports
- 79.135.251.82: AS45013 LLC Econotel, ISP PJSC Rostelecom, residential, 648 reports
- 171.22.18.65: AS209371 Private Network, ISP Hostealo.es - Germany, hosting, 578 reports
- 213.124.148.22: AS33915 Vodafone Libertel B.V., ISP B2B Zwolle, residential, 512 reports
- 49.124.149.207: AS4818 DiGi Telecommunications Sdn. Bhd., residential, 403 reports
- 185.220.101.31: AS208294 CIA Triad Security LLC, ISP Artikel10 e.V., Tor exit, 228 reports
- 212.33.198.115: AS43754 Asiatech Data Transmission Company, residential, 212 reports
- 40.74.211.76: AS8075 Microsoft Corporation, hosting, 165 reports
- 34.35.76.234: ASN not resolved, ISP Google LLC, hosting, 71 reports
Attacker Infrastructure & Networks
Of the 15 enriched addresses, seven sat on hosting or content delivery networks, seven on residential broadband, and one was a Tor exit, per AbuseIPDB usage type, with ownership from AlienVault OTX. The residential half points to compromised home routers and endpoints rather than malicious ISPs. None matched known malware command-and-control or payload hosting in abuse.ch ThreatFox and URLhaus.
Hosting Providers
- AS14061 DigitalOcean LLC: 64.225.30.2
- AS7029 Windstream Communications LLC: 94.154.43.84
- AS45753 NetSec Limited: 103.117.145.130
- ASN not resolved, ISP Hydra Communications Ltd: 85.204.70.102
- AS209371 Private Network: 171.22.18.65
- AS8075 Microsoft Corporation: 40.74.211.76
- ASN not resolved, ISP Google LLC: 34.35.76.234
Residential Networks
- AS4609 Companhia De Telecomunicacoes: 182.93.7.194
- AS6939 Hurricane Electric LLC: 65.49.20.82
- ASN not resolved, ISP Vishwamani Solutions Pvt Ltd: 103.191.204.229
- AS45013 LLC Econotel: 79.135.251.82
- AS33915 Vodafone Libertel B.V.: 213.124.148.22
- AS4818 DiGi Telecommunications Sdn. Bhd.: 49.124.149.207
- AS43754 Asiatech Data Transmission Company: 212.33.198.115
Tor Exit Nodes
- AS208294 CIA Triad Security LLC: 185.220.101.31
Exploited Vulnerabilities
CISA added four vulnerabilities to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog during the week of September 14 to 20, 2026. A pair of Cisco flaws targeting enterprise perimeter systems led the list: CVE-2026-76461, a SQL injection in Secure Email Gateway's AsyncOS enabling unauthenticated root command execution (due date September 17), and CVE-2026-76460, an authentication bypass in Identity Services Engine allowing unauthenticated access to the management interface (due date September 19). Both vulnerabilities are under active exploitation with public proof-of-concept code, per AlienVault OTX (16 and 13 community threat pulses respectively, pulled September 21). The remaining two KEV additions were CVE-2026-87886 (Acronis Backup cPanel/Plesk privilege escalation, due September 19) and CVE-2026-58704 (Google Pixel cellular modem authorization bypass, due September 19).
Malware & Command-and-Control Activity
A two-day window of high-confidence indicators from ThreatFox (pulled September 21, 2026) captured 2,027 IOCs, including 440 fresh command-and-control nodes. AsyncRAT dominated with 974 indicators, followed by ClearFake (120), VShell (103), Cobalt Strike (101), and an unattributed loader (92). The AsyncRAT volume signals sustained credential-theft and remote-access campaigns. ClearFake and IClickFix (75 IOCs) represent browser-update social engineering chains delivering malware via fake software prompts. Legacy botnet activity persisted with Mirai (74 IOCs). The Cobalt Strike presence (101 IOCs) reflects ongoing post-exploitation framework abuse in intrusion chains.
The Hunting Takeaway
This week's double Cisco vulnerability event creates a clear behavioral hunting target: unauthorized authentication to Cisco Identity Services Engine and anomalous command execution on Secure Email Gateway appliances. Hunt for ISE authentication events where the user or source IP has no prior login history, especially from external or unexpected internal networks. On email gateway appliances, look for AsyncOS process execution outside normal administrative sessions, particularly shell command invocations or unexpected child processes spawned by the email filtering service. Both patterns signal exploitation of CVE-2026-76460 (ISE auth bypass) and CVE-2026-76461 (email gateway SQL injection to root RCE).
Microsoft KQL (Cisco ISE authentication anomaly hunt):
// Hunt for Cisco ISE authentication from previously unseen source IPs
// Requires syslog ingestion from ISE appliances into a Syslog or CommonSecurityLog table
let lookback = 30d;
let recent = 7d;
let knownSources = Syslog
| where TimeGenerated between (ago(lookback) .. ago(recent))
| where SyslogMessage has "CISE" and SyslogMessage has_any ("Passed-Authentication", "authentication succeeded")
| extend SourceIP = extract(@"(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})", 1, SyslogMessage)
| where isnotempty(SourceIP)
| distinct SourceIP;
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(recent)
| where SyslogMessage has "CISE" and SyslogMessage has_any ("Passed-Authentication", "authentication succeeded")
| extend SourceIP = extract(@"(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})", 1, SyslogMessage)
| where isnotempty(SourceIP)
| where SourceIP !in (knownSources)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SourceIP, SyslogMessage
| order by TimeGenerated desc
Splunk SPL (Cisco Secure Email Gateway command execution anomaly hunt):
index=email sourcetype=cisco:esa
(process_name=*sh OR process_name=python* OR process_name=perl OR ParentProcessName=*asyncos*)
earliest=-7d
| eval CommandLine=coalesce(CommandLine, process)
| where isnotnull(CommandLine) AND (like(CommandLine, "%/bin/%") OR like(CommandLine, "%sh -c%") OR like(CommandLine, "%wget%") OR like(CommandLine, "%curl%"))
| stats count min(_time) as FirstSeen max(_time) as LastSeen values(CommandLine) as Commands by host, user, process_name
| convert ctime(FirstSeen) ctime(LastSeen)
| where count < 5
| table FirstSeen, LastSeen, host, user, process_name, Commands, count
| sort -LastSeen
Note: These queries were generated with AI assistance and are a starting point, not a verdict. A query that returns no results does not mean the threat is absent. Confirm that the referenced indexes, sourcetypes, and field names exist in your environment, that the relevant data is actually being ingested, and that names match your schema (watch for spelling and naming drift). Validate against your own ingest and audit trails before drawing conclusions.
Check Your Environment
Use the queries below to sweep your logs for this week's high-confidence malicious IPs and cross-reference the KEV additions against your vulnerability inventory. These are environment sweeps, not behavioral hunts. No results do not mean no threat.
Microsoft KQL (network connection sweep for this week's top malicious IPs):
// Check for connections to this week's 100% confidence AbuseIPDB malicious IPs
// Excludes the benign Shadowserver scanner
let MaliciousIPs = dynamic([
"64.225.30.2", "103.117.145.130", "40.74.211.76", "182.93.7.194",
"49.124.149.207", "79.135.251.82", "85.204.70.102", "171.22.18.65",
"212.33.198.115", "34.35.76.234", "213.124.148.22", "185.220.101.31",
"103.191.204.229", "94.154.43.84"
]);
union
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where RemoteIP in (MaliciousIPs) or LocalIP in (MaliciousIPs)),
(CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where DestinationIP in (MaliciousIPs) or SourceIP in (MaliciousIPs))
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, SourceIP=coalesce(LocalIP, SourceIP), DestinationIP=coalesce(RemoteIP, DestinationIP), RemotePort, Action
| order by TimeGenerated desc
Splunk SPL (firewall/proxy sweep for this week's malicious IPs):
index=network OR index=proxy
(src_ip IN ("64.225.30.2", "103.117.145.130", "40.74.211.76", "182.93.7.194", "49.124.149.207", "79.135.251.82", "85.204.70.102", "171.22.18.65", "212.33.198.115", "34.35.76.234", "213.124.148.22", "185.220.101.31", "103.191.204.229", "94.154.43.84")
OR dest_ip IN ("64.225.30.2", "103.117.145.130", "40.74.211.76", "182.93.7.194", "49.124.149.207", "79.135.251.82", "85.204.70.102", "171.22.18.65", "212.33.198.115", "34.35.76.234", "213.124.148.22", "185.220.101.31", "103.191.204.229", "94.154.43.84"))
earliest=-7d
| table _time, src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port, action, bytes
| sort -_time
Vulnerability check: Cross-reference CVE-2026-76461 (Cisco Secure Email Gateway), CVE-2026-76460 (Cisco ISE), CVE-2026-87886 (Acronis Backup), and CVE-2026-58704 (Google Pixel) against your asset inventory. Patch immediately where present.
Note: These queries were generated with AI assistance and are a starting point, not a verdict. A query that returns no results does not mean the threat is absent. Confirm that the referenced indexes, sourcetypes, and field names exist in your environment, that the relevant data is actually being ingested, and that names match your schema (watch for spelling and naming drift). Validate against your own ingest and audit trails before drawing conclusions.
Appendix: Raw Data Tables
The tables below are the tabular view of the charts above. Each table carries its source and pull date. Click column headers to sort; use the Copy button to export.
Top Ransomware Groups
ransomware.live, pulled Sep 21, 2026
| Group | Victims This Week | Victims Last Week | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| qilin | 31 | 8 | +287% |
| thegentlemen | 30 | 18 | +67% |
| N0n | 11 | 0 | NEW |
| akira | 10 | 7 | +43% |
| Storm | 8 | 0 | NEW |
| safepay | 8 | 11 | -27% |
| emperador | 7 | 6 | +17% |
| Panzer | 6 | 0 | NEW |
| lockbit5 | 5 | 0 | NEW |
| metaencryptor | 5 | 0 | NEW |
Most-Reported Malicious IPs
AbuseIPDB 100% confidence, pulled Sep 21, 2026
| IP Address | Country | Total Reports | Distinct Reporters | Origin Type | ASN |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 182.93.7.194 | MO | 14,817 | 1,249 | Residential | AS4609 |
| 64.225.30.2 | US | 3,560 | 963 | Hosting | AS14061 |
| 94.154.43.84 | NL | 2,433 | 535 | Hosting | AS7029 |
| 65.49.20.82 | US | 2,020 | 147 | Residential* | AS6939 |
| 103.117.145.130 | HK | 1,676 | 694 | Hosting | AS45753 |
| 85.204.70.102 | FR | 1,515 | 453 | Hosting | N/A |
| 103.191.204.229 | IN | 982 | 256 | Residential | N/A |
| 79.135.251.82 | RU | 648 | 158 | Residential | AS45013 |
| 171.22.18.65 | DE | 578 | 337 | Hosting | AS209371 |
| 213.124.148.22 | NL | 512 | 134 | Residential | AS33915 |
| 49.124.149.207 | MY | 403 | 106 | Residential | AS4818 |
| 185.220.101.31 | DE | 228 | 105 | Business†| AS208294 |
| 212.33.198.115 | IR | 212 | 172 | Residential | AS43754 |
| 40.74.211.76 | US | 165 | 69 | Hosting | AS8075 |
| 34.35.76.234 | ZA | 71 | 52 | Hosting | N/A |
*Shadowserver Foundation benign research scanner. †Tor exit node operated by Artikel10 e.V.
New CISA KEV Additions
CISA KEV catalog, pulled Sep 21, 2026
| CVE | Vendor/Product | Vulnerability | Date Added | Due Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-76461 | Cisco Secure Email Gateway | SQL Injection (root RCE) | Sep 14, 2026 | Sep 17, 2026 |
| CVE-2026-76460 | Cisco Identity Services Engine | Auth Bypass | Sep 16, 2026 | Sep 19, 2026 |
| CVE-2026-87886 | Acronis Backup | Privilege Escalation | Sep 16, 2026 | Sep 19, 2026 |
| CVE-2026-58704 | Google Pixel | Authorization Bypass | Sep 16, 2026 | Sep 19, 2026 |
Top Malware Families
ThreatFox two-day window, pulled Sep 21, 2026
| Malware Family | IOC Count |
|---|---|
| AsyncRAT | 974 |
| ClearFake | 120 |
| VShell | 103 |
| Cobalt Strike | 101 |
| Unknown Loader | 92 |
| Unknown malware | 81 |
| IClickFix | 75 |
| Mirai | 74 |
| Vidar | 59 |
| php.shin_webshell | 51 |
Methodology & Sources
This recap aggregates open-source threat intelligence feeds captured during the week of September 14 to 20, 2026, and cross-references them to surface trends and behavioral hunting angles. The figures are aggregate public statistics, not Focused Hunts detections, and represent a snapshot of the threat landscape as visible through these sources at the time of collection. Each section cites its upstream provider and pull date inline; the full data is retained in a timestamped snapshot file for audit and reproducibility.
Week-over-week trend comparisons appear once successive snapshots exist. When ledger coverage for a given week is incomplete, the total is reported as a floor with the covered sub-range disclosed. Unavailable source classes are omitted rather than estimated. Actor claims and confirmed intelligence listings (such as CISA KEV) are kept separate and labeled as such. The hunting queries are behavioral starting points, not verdicts; they require validation against your own telemetry and schema. A query that returns no results does not mean the threat is absent.
